The 'machine-or-transformation' test is no longer the only test for determining patent eligibility of processes in the United States.
Despite this apparent clarity in the law, as the number of so-called 'business method' patent applications began to grow, the public began to perceive that many such applications were of dubious quality. As the backlog grew, the USPTO began to revive old, discredited doctrines, like the 'technological arts' test, to deny claims as not being directed to patenteligible subject matter and to avoid the need for substantive examination on the merits of the claimed invention.
The US Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences appeared to stop this practice of invoking defunct tests for patenteligibility in Ex Parte Lundgren, 76 USPQ2d 1385 (BPAI 2005) . The Board confirmed in Lundgren that 'there is currently no judicially recognized separate "technological arts" test to determine patent eligible subject matter under Section 101'. At that time, patent practitioners generally considered that the final barrier to patent-eligibility of 'business method' patent claims had been removed.
Prosecution and appeal of Bilski to the board
Meanwhile, the Bilski Application that continued to wind its way through the patent application process presented for examination eleven claims, including representative claim 1 which read as follows:
1. A method for managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by a commodity provider at a fixed price comprising the steps of: a. initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and consumers of said commodity wherein said consumers purchase said commodity at a fixed rate based upon historical averages, said fixed rate corresponding to a risk position of said consumer; b. identifying market participants for said commodity having a counter-risk position to said consumers; and c. initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and said market participants at a second fixed rate such that said series of market participant transactions balances the risk position of said series of consumer transactions.
The eleven pending claims were finally rejected by the patent examiner as summarized in the Final Rejection as follows:
"Regarding … claims 1-11, the invention is not implemented on a specific apparatus and merely manipulates [an] abstract idea and solves a purely mathematical problem without any limitation to a practical application, therefore, the invention is not directed to the technological arts." This rejection, which essentially mimicked a so-called 'technological arts' rejection, was made at a time when patent examiners would continue to invoke this type of rejection. In April 2003 the Board heard argument for the first time on the patentability of the Bilski Application claims. No decision ensued from this hearing, and a new hearing before a reconstituted Board led to a lengthy, informative decision (Bilski I) which held 'the examiner's determination that claim 1, and claims 2-11, which stand or fall therewith, are directed to nonstatutory subject matter under 35 USC §101 is well founded'.
Most observers considered then that although Bilski I discussed Lundgren, its rationale and holding-written by the dissenting Administrative Patent Judge from Lundgren-seemed contrary to the rationale, holding and tenor of Lundgren.
With Bilski I the relative certainty that patent practitioners had felt with regard to the patent-eligibility of most types of patent application claims after Lundgren began to wane, and debate resumed as to what types of patent claims should even be considered patent-eligible.
Legal developments between Bilski I and Bilski II
After Bilski I a number of controversial decisions seeking to limit the scope of patent-eligible subject matter began to issue both from the Board and the 
Bilski II
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, after oral argument but before any decision was rendered by the original panel, the Court took the case en banc to be heard by the full court, and identified the following five questions:
1. Whether claim 1 of the 08/833,892 patent application claims patent-eligible subject matter under 35 USC §101?
2. What standard should govern in determining whether a process is patent-eligible subject matter under section 101?
3. Whether the claimed subject matter is not patent-eligible because it constitutes an abstract idea or mental process; when does a claim that contains both mental and physical steps create patent-eligible subject matter?
4. Whether a method or process must result in a physical transformation of an article or be tied to a machine to be patent-eligible subject matter under section 101?
5. Whether it is appropriate to reconsider State Street Bank & Trust Co. v Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998 ), and AT&T Corp. v Excel Communs., Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999 , in this case and, if so, whether those cases should be overruled in any respect?
The court's order also set a schedule for amici curiae to submit briefs. The majority explained that the purpose of this test is to preclude processes that preempt so-called 'fundamental principles' (ie, laws of nature, physical phenomena and abstract ideas) from being patent-eligible. They added the further qualifiers that, under either branch of the test, the analysis should consider that:
1. the use of specific machine or transformation of an article must impose meaningful limits on the claim's scope to impart patent-eligibility and 2. the involvement of the machine or transformation in the claimed process must not merely be insignificant extrasolution activity.
Significantly, the majority dispelled some misconceptions and confirmed that 'whether a claimed process is novel or non-obvious is irrelevant to the §101 analysis', recognizing that the analyses under § §102, 103, etc., should not be commingled with the §101 analysis.
Similarly, the majority 'made clear that it is inappropriate to determine the patent-eligibility of a claim as a whole based on whether selected limitations constitute patent-eligible subject matter. After all, even though a fundamental principle itself is not patent-eligible, processes incorporating a fundamental principle may be patent-eligible.
Thus, it is irrelevant that any individual step or limitation of such processes by itself would be unpatentable under §101.' (emphasis added).
When it came time to apply these principles to the Bilski claims, the majority found that the claims failed both parts of the test.
Post Bilski II developments in the lower courts and at the PTO
After Bilski II issued, the issue of patent-eligibility continued to be addressed at the Board and in the lower courts, as well as the Federal Circuit, at a much more rapid rate.
The Board began to issue a number of confusing and potentially disturbing opinions regarding the scope of patenteligible subject matter. Some district courts also began to turn to these decisions in finding that certain claims were not patent-eligible. Likewise, the Federal Circuit continued to issue opinions interpreting the 'machine-or-transformation' test. A number of these decisions have now been vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court to the Federal Circuit to be reassessed in view of Bilski III. Justice Kennedy's analysis of how to determine patent-eligibility of a particular claim focused on the statutory requirements and traditional Supreme Court precedent as explained in Diamond v Diehr, 450 US 175 (1981 ), Parker v Flook, 437 US 584 (1978 and Gottschalk v Benson, 409 US 63 (1972) . In particular, he recognized that 'Section 101 thus specifies four independent categories of inventions or discoveries that are eligible for protection: processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter.' He also endorsed the view that '"Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope. " Diamond v Chakrabarty, 447 US 303, 308 … (1980) .'
Justice Kennedy recognized that, despite this wide scope, and consistent with the Section 101's requirement that patenteligible inventions be 'new and useful', '[t]he [Supreme] Court's precedents provide three specific exceptions to §101's broad patent-eligibility principles: "laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas." Chakrabarty, supra, at 309.' He then rejected attempts to limit the four categories of inventions or discoveries beyond their 'ordinary, contemporary, common meaning' or express statutory definition (as in the case of 'process'):
"Any suggestion in this Court's case law that the Patent Act's terms deviate from their ordinary meaning has only been an explanation for the exceptions for laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas. See Parker v Flook, 437 US 584, 588-589 … (1978) . This Court has not indicated that the existence of these well-established exceptions gives the Judiciary carte blanche to impose other limitations that are inconsistent with the text and the statute's purpose and design. Concerns about attempts to call any form of human activity a "process" can be met by making sure the claim meets the requirements of §101."
A In sum, the majority analysis adopted a strict interpretation of the Patent Act and rejected a narrow application of the machine-or-transformation test to determine patent eligibility under 35 USC §101 in favour of an analysis under the more fundamental principles from which the Federal Circuit sought to develop the machine-or-transformation test. Justice Kennedy summarized the Court's holding as follows:
"Today, the Court once again declines to impose limitations on the Patent Act that are inconsistent with the Act's text. The patent application here can be rejected under our precedents on the unpatentability of abstract ideas. 
